

Crawley Borough Council

Report to Overview & Scrutiny Commission 5 February 2018

Report to Cabinet 7 February 2018

Treasury Management Strategy 2018/2019

Report of the Head of Finance, Revenues and Benefits – **FIN/433**

1. Purpose

1.1 The Strategy for 2018/19 covers two main areas:

Capital Issues

- the capital plans and the prudential indicators;
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.

Treasury Management Issues

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- the policy on use of external service providers.

1.2 In respect of non-Housing Revenue Account activities, the Council's current policy is to remain debt free until the outcome of the Historic England review of the Town Hall is known building works commence; and invest according to the principles of security, liquidity and yield.

1.3 There are no material changes to the Investment Strategy in section 7 and Appendix 3 compared with the 2017/2018 Strategy.

2. Recommendations

2.1 To the Overview and Scrutiny Commission:

That the Commission considers the report and decides what comments, if any, it wishes to submit to the Cabinet.

2.2 To the Cabinet

The Cabinet is requested to recommend to Council the approval of:-

- a) the Treasury Prudential Indicators and the Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) Statement contained within Section 5;
- b) the Treasury Management Strategy contained within Section 6;
- c) the Investment Strategy contained within Section 7, and the detailed criteria included in Appendix 3;

3. Reasons for the Recommendations

- 3.1 The Council's financial regulations, in accordance with the CIPFA Code of Practice for Treasury Management, requires a Treasury Management Strategy to be approved for the forthcoming financial year. This report complies with these requirements.

4. Background

- 4.1 The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.
- 4.2 The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.
- 4.3 CIPFA defines treasury management as:

"The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."
- 4.3 This report takes into account the revenue and capital implications arising in the 2018/19 Budget and Council Tax report (FIN/434). This report excludes any other implications of the New Town Hall. A revised Treasury Management Strategy will be presented when we know the outcome of the Historic England review; contracts have been signed and tender submissions received.

5. The Capital Prudential Indicators 2018/19 – 2020/21

5.1 The Capital Expenditure Plans

5.1.1 The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

5.1.2 **Capital expenditure.** This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts:

Capital Expenditure £'000	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Cabinet	1,649	2,285	6,758	200	-
Resources	561	227	506	-	-
Environment Services & Sustainability	1,257	1,137	2,452	538	-
Planning & Economic Development	7,941	168	1,700	4,832	-
Public Protection & Community Engagement	20	95	-	-	-
Housing Services	958	631	4,746	70	-
Wellbeing	2,437	2,009	2,353	428	140
General Fund	14,823	6,552	18,515	6,068	140
HRA	16,294	20,257	53,829	42,581	9,030
Total	31,117	26,809	72,344	48,649	9,170

5.1.3 The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need.

Financing of Capital Expenditure £'000	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Capital receipts	3,237	4,883	14,894	5,874	40
Capital reserves	8,123	25	-	-	-
1-4-1 receipts	3,495	3,183	12,895	9,110	-
Replacement funds	852	191	259	100	100
Capital grants	2,400	1,453	2,162	94	-
Major Repairs Reserve	13,009	17,074	42,134	33,471	9,030
Net financing need for the year	-	-	-	-	-

5.2 The Council's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement).

5.2.1 The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.

5.2.2 The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections below:

£'000	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Capital Financing Requirement					
CFR – General Fund	0	0	0	0	0
CFR - HRA	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325
Total CFR	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325
Movement in CFR	0	0	0	0	0

Movement in CFR represented by					
Net financing need for the year (above)	0	0	0	0	0
Less MRP/VRP and other financing movements	0	0	0	0	0
Movement in CFR	0	0	0	0	0

5.2.3 The large CFR on the HRA is due to the self-financing settlement in 2011/12.

5.3 Minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy statement

5.3.1 The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

5.3.2 Government regulations have been issued which require the full Council to approve **an MRP Statement** in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision. The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:

5.3.3 For capital expenditure incurred before 1 April 2008 or which in the future will be Supported Capital Expenditure, the MRP policy will be:

- **Existing practice** - MRP will follow the existing practice outlined in former CLG regulations (option 1)

This option provides for an approximate 4% reduction in the borrowing need (CFR) each year.

5.3.4 From 1 April 2008 for all unsupported borrowing (including PFI and finance leases) the MRP policy will be:

- **Asset life method** – MRP will be based on the estimated life of the assets, in accordance with the regulations (this option must be applied for any expenditure capitalised under a Capitalisation Direction) (option 3)

This option provides for a reduction in the borrowing need over approximately the asset's life.

5.3.5 There is no requirement on the HRA to make a minimum revenue provision but there is a requirement for a charge for depreciation to be made.

5.4 Core funds and expected investment balances

5.4.1 The application of resources (capital receipts, reserves etc.) to either finance capital expenditure or other budget decisions to support the revenue budget will have an ongoing impact on investments unless resources are supplemented each year from new sources (asset sales etc.). Detailed below are estimates of the year end balances for each resource and anticipated day to day cash flow balances.

Year End Resources £'000	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Fund balances / reserves	60,875	50,152	27,310	14,739	25,709
Capital receipts*	41,395	40,851	19,562	11,088	17,548
Total core funds	102,270	91,003	46,872	25,827	43,257
Working capital	15,913	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000
Under/over borrowing	0	0	0	0	0
Expected investments	118,183	106,003	61,872	30,827	58,257

* includes 1-4-1 receipts

5.5 Affordability prudential indicators

5.5.1 The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing prudential indicators, but within this framework prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances. The Council is asked to approve the following indicators:

5.5.2 **Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream.** This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

%	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
General Fund	-6.01%	-5.03%	-7.43%
HRA	16.86%	16.55%	16.07%

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this budget report.

5.5.5 HRA ratios

	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
HRA debt £'000	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325
HRA revenues £'000	47,642	47,331	48,047	49,606	51,331
Ratio of debt to revenues %	546%	550%	542%	525%	507%

	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
HRA debt £'000	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325
Number of HRA dwellings	7,843	7,964	8,128	8,126	8,173
Debt per dwelling £	33,192	32,688	32,028	32,036	31,852

6. Borrowing

6.1 The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 5 provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

6.2 Current portfolio position

6.2.1 The Council's treasury portfolio position at 31 March 2017, with forward projections are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt (the treasury management operations), against the underlying capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

£'000	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
External Debt					
Debt at 1 April	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325
Expected change in Debt	0	0	0	0	0
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL)	0	0	0	0	0
Expected change in OLTL	0	0	0	0	0
Actual gross debt at 31 March	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325
The Capital Financing Requirement	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325
Under / (over) borrowing	0	0	0	0	0

6.2.2 Within the prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2018/19 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years,

but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue or speculative purposes.

- 6.2.3 The Head of Finance, Revenues and Benefits reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this budget report.

6.3 Treasury Indicators: Limits to Borrowing Activity

- 6.3.1 **The Operational Boundary.** This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt and the ability to fund under-borrowing by other cash resources.

Operational boundary £'000	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Debt	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325
Other long term liabilities	0	0	0	0
Total	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325

- 6.3.2 **The Authorised Limit for external debt.** A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

- 6.3.3 This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all Councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.

- 6.3.4 The Council is asked to approve the following Authorised Limit:

Authorised limit £'000	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Debt	270,325	270,325	270,325	270,325
Other long term liabilities	0	0	0	0
Total	270,325	270,325	270,325	270,325

- 6.3.5 Separately, the Council is also limited to a maximum HRA CFR through the HRA self-financing regime. This limit is currently:

HRA Debt Limit £'000	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
HRA debt cap	263,902	263,902	263,902	263,902
HRA CFR	260,325	260,325	260,325	260,325
HRA headroom	3,577	3,577	3,577	3,577

6.3.6 Treasury indicators for debt

There are three debt related treasury activity limits. The purpose of these are to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest

rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs / improve performance. The indicators are:

- Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure. This identifies a maximum limit for variable interest rates based upon the debt position net of investments;
- Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure. This is similar to the previous indicator and covers a maximum limit on fixed interest rates;
- Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.

6.3.7 The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

£'000	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Interest rate Exposures			
	Upper	Upper	Upper
Limits on fixed interest rates:			
• Debt only	270,325	270,325	270,325
• Investments only	140,000	140,000	140,000
Limits on variable interest rates			
• Debt only	10,000	10,000	10,000
• Investments only	40,000	40,000	40,000
Maturity Structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2018/19			
	Lower	Upper	
Under 12 months	0%	10%	
12 months to 2 years	0%	10%	
2 years to 5 years	0%	20%	
5 years to 10 years	0%	40%	
10 years to 20 years	0%	65%	
20 years to 30 years	0%	15%	
30 years to 40 years	0%	10%	
40 years to 50 years	0%	10%	

6.4 Prospects for Interest Rates

6.4.1 The Council has appointed Link Asset Services as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives Link's central view.

	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21
Bank Rate	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.25%
5yr PWLB Rate	1.50%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%
10yr PWLB View	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%
25yr PWLB View	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%
50yr PWLB Rate	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%

- 6.4.2 Investment returns are likely to remain low during 2018/19 but to be on a gently rising trend over the next few years.
- 6.4.3 There will remain a cost of carry to any new borrowing which causes an increase in investments as this will incur a revenue loss between borrowing costs and investment returns.

6.5 Borrowing Strategy

- 6.5.1 The Council borrowed £260.325m in 2011/12 for the HRA self-financing settlement. The General Fund remains debt free, and this position is not expected to change during 2018/19.

6.6 Policy on borrowing in advance of need

- 6.6.1 The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.
- 6.6.2 Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

6.7 Debt rescheduling

- 6.7.1 As short term borrowing rates will be considerably cheaper than longer term fixed interest rates, there may be potential opportunities to generate savings by switching from long term debt to short term debt. However, these savings will need to be considered in the light of the current treasury position and the size of the cost of debt repayment (premiums incurred).
- 6.7.2 The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:
- the generation of cash savings and / or discounted cash flow savings;
 - helping to fulfil the treasury strategy;
 - enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).
- 6.7.3 Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any residual potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt.
- 6.7.4 All rescheduling will be reported to the Cabinet, at the earliest meeting following its action.

7. Annual Investment Strategy

7.1 Investment Policy

- 7.1.1 The Council's investment policy has regard to the Government's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance") and the revised CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017 ("the CIPFA TM Code"). The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second and then return.
- 7.1.2 In accordance with the above guidance from the Government and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.
- 7.1.3 Ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "credit default swaps" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.
- 7.1.4 Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.
- 7.1.5 Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in Appendix 3 under the 'specified' and 'non-specified' investments categories. Counterparty limits will be as set through the Council's treasury management practices – schedules.

7.2 Creditworthiness policy

- 7.2.1 This Council applies the creditworthiness service provided by Link Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:
- credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
 - CDS spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
 - sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.
- 7.2.2 This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the Council to determine the suggested duration for

investments. The Council will therefore use counterparties within the following durational bands:

- Yellow 5 years *
- Dark pink 5 years for Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit score of 1.25
- Light pink 5 years for Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit score of 1.5
- Purple 2 years
- Blue 1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi nationalised UK Banks)
- Orange 1 year
- Red 6 months
- Green 100 days
- No colour not to be used

Y	Pi1	Pi2	P	B	O	R	G	N/C
1	1.25	1.5	2	3	4	5	6	7
Up to 5yrs	Up to 5yrs	Up to 5yrs	Up to 2yrs	Up to 1yr	Up to 1yr	Up to 6mths	Up to 100days	No Colour

	Colour (and long term rating where applicable)	Money Limit	Time Limit
Banks *	yellow	unlimited	5 yrs
Banks	purple	£15m	2 yrs
Banks – part nationalised	blue	£15m	1 yr
Banks	orange	£10m	1 yr
Banks	red	£10m	6 mths
Banks	green	£10m	100 days
Banks	No colour	Not to be used	
Limit 3 category – Council's banker (not meeting Banks 1)	n/a	£1m	1 day
Corporate Bonds	AA-	£5m	2 yrs
	A-	£2m	1 yr
Repurchase agreements	AA	£5m	5 yrs
DMADF	AAA	unlimited	6 months
Local authorities	n/a	£15m	5 yrs
Housing Associations	AA-	£2m	1 yr
Money market funds	AAA	£15m	liquid
Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit score of 1.25	Dark pink / AAA	£10m	liquid
Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit score of 1.5	Light pink / AAA	£10m	liquid

** Please note: the yellow colour category is for UK Government debt, or its equivalent, constant NAV money market funds and collateralised deposits where the collateral is UK Government debt.*

- 7.2.3 Link Asset Services' creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings and by using a risk weighted scoring system, does not give undue preponderance to just one agency's ratings.
- 7.2.4 Typically the minimum credit ratings criteria the Council use will be a short term rating (Fitch or equivalents) of short term rating F1, long term rating A-. There may be occasions when the counterparty ratings from one rating agency are marginally lower than these ratings but may still be used. In these instances consideration will be given to the whole range of ratings available, or other topical market information, to support their use.
- 7.2.5 All credit ratings will be monitored daily. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of Link Asset Services' creditworthiness service.
- if a downgrade results in the counterparty / investment scheme no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately.
 - in addition to the use of credit ratings the Council will be advised of information in movements in credit default swap spreads against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a daily basis. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the Council's lending list.
- 7.2.6 Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition this Council will also use market data and market information, information on any external support for banks to help support its decision making process.

7.3 Ethical Investment Policy

- 7.3.1 The Council will not undertake direct investment or borrowing activities with organisations whose core activities include:
- Armaments – weapon systems
 - Gambling
 - Pornography
 - Tobacco
 - Pay-day loans
- 7.3.2 In order to comply with treasury management guidance, the Council's investments will prioritise security, liquidity and yield in that order. The Ethical Investment Policy thereby becomes a fourth consideration in the decision making process.
- 7.3.3 The core activities in the Ethical Investment Policy above has been chosen after careful consideration of the Policy direction of the administration, the officer time in implementing the policy, the cost of external resources, and the timeliness of investment decisions.

7.4 Country limits

7.4.1 The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- from Fitch (or equivalent). The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix 4. This list will be added to, or deducted from, by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.

7.5 Investment strategy

7.5.1 **In-house funds.** Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

7.5.2 **Investment returns expectations.** Bank Rate is forecast to stay flat at 0.50% until quarter 4 2018 and not rise above 1.25% by quarter 1 2021. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- 2017/18 0.50%
- 2018/19 0.75%
- 2019/20 1.00%
- 2020/21 1.25%

7.5.3 The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to 6 months during each financial year are as follows:

2017/18	0.50%
2018/19	0.80%
2019/20	0.90%
2020/21	1.25%
2021/22	1.50%
2022/23	1.75%
2023/24	2.00%
Later years	2.75%

7.5.4 The overall balance of risks to these forecasts is currently probably slightly skewed to the upside and are dependent on how strong GDP growth turns out, how quickly inflation pressures rise and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.

7.5.5 **Investment treasury indicator and limit** - total principal funds invested for greater than 365 days. These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.

The Council is asked to approve the treasury indicator and limit: -

Maximum principal sums invested > 365 days			
£m	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Principal sums invested > 365 days	£50m	£50m	£50m

7.5.6 **Investment Risk Benchmarking.** These benchmarks are simple guides to maximum risk, so they may be breached from time to time, depending on movements in interest rates and counterparty criteria. The purpose of the benchmark is that officers will monitor the current and trend position and amend the operational strategy to manage risk as conditions change. Any breach of the benchmarks will be reported, with supporting reasons in the Mid-Year or Annual Report.

7.5.7 Security - The Council's maximum security risk benchmark for the current portfolio, when compared to these historic default tables, is:

- **0.15% historic risk of default when compared to the whole portfolio.**

7.5.8 Liquidity – in respect of this area the Council seeks to maintain:

- Bank overdraft - £0.1m
- Liquid short term deposits of at least £2m available with a week's notice.
- Weighted Average Life benchmark is expected to be 0.7 years, with a maximum of 1.20 years.

7.5.9 Yield - local measures of yield benchmarks are:

- Investments – internal returns 0.2% above the 7 day LIBID rate

7.5.10 And in addition that the security benchmark for each individual year is:

	1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years	5 years
Maximum	0.03%	0.22%	0.40%	0.56%	0.74%

Note: This benchmark is an average risk of default measure, and would not constitute an expectation of loss against a particular investment.

7.5.11 At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

7.6 Treasury management consultants

7.6.1 The Council uses Link Asset Services, Treasury solutions as its external treasury management advisors.

7.6.2 The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon external service providers.

7.6.3 It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

8. Implications

8.1 There are no significant legal implications as a result of the recommendations in this report. Compliance with the CIPFA Code of Practice for Treasury Management in the public services, the Local Government Investment

Guidance provides that the council's investments are and will continue to be, within its legal powers conferred under the Local Government Act 2003.

9. Background Papers

[Treasury Management Strategy for 2017/2018 – Cabinet, 8 February 2017 \[report FIN/404 refers\]](#).

[Treasury Management Mid-Year Review 2017/2018 – Cabinet, 29 November 2017 \[report FIN/426 refers\]](#).

2018/2019 Budget and Council Tax – Cabinet, 7 February 2018 [report FIN/434 refers].

“Treasury Management in the Public Services – Code of Practice and Cross-Sectoral Guidance Notes”, 2017 Edition – Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy.

“The Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities”, 2017 Edition – Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy.

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Appendix 1: Interest Rate Forecasts 2018 – 2021

PWLB rates and forecast shown below have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012.

Link Asset Services Interest Rate View													
	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21
Bank Rate	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.25%
5yr PWLB rate	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%
10yr PWLB rate	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%
25yr PWLB rate	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%
50yr PWLB rate	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%

APPENDIX 2: Economic Background

GLOBAL OUTLOOK. World growth looks to be on an encouraging trend of stronger performance, rising earnings and falling levels of unemployment. In October, the IMF upgraded its forecast for world growth from 3.2% to 3.6% for 2017 and 3.7% for 2018.

In addition, **inflation prospects are generally muted** and it is particularly notable that **wage inflation** has been subdued despite unemployment falling to historically very low levels in the UK and US. This has led to many comments by economists that there appears to have been a fundamental shift downwards in the Phillips curve (this plots the correlation between levels of unemployment and inflation e.g. if the former is low the latter tends to be high). In turn, this raises the question of what has caused this? The likely answers probably lay in a combination of a shift towards flexible working, self-employment, falling union membership and a consequent reduction in union power and influence in the economy, and increasing globalisation and specialisation of individual countries, which has meant that labour in one country is in competition with labour in other countries which may be offering lower wage rates, increased productivity or a combination of the two. In addition, technology is probably also exerting downward pressure on wage rates and this is likely to grow with an accelerating movement towards automation, robots and artificial intelligence, leading to many repetitive tasks being taken over by machines or computers. Indeed, this is now being labelled as being the start of the **fourth industrial revolution**.

KEY RISKS - central bank monetary policy measures

Looking back on nearly ten years since the financial crash of 2008 when liquidity suddenly dried up in financial markets, it can be assessed that central banks' monetary policy measures to counter the sharp world recession were successful. The key monetary policy measures they used were a combination of lowering central interest rates and flooding financial markets with liquidity, particularly through unconventional means such as Quantitative Easing (QE), where central banks bought large amounts of central government debt and smaller sums of other debt.

The key issue now is that that period of stimulating economic recovery and warding off the threat of deflation is coming towards its close and a new period has already started in the US, and more recently in the UK, on reversing those measures i.e. by raising central rates and (for the US) reducing central banks' holdings of government and other debt. These measures are now required in order to stop the trend of an on-going reduction in spare capacity in the economy, and of unemployment falling to such low levels that the re-emergence of inflation is viewed as a major risk. It is, therefore, crucial that central banks get their timing right and do not cause shocks to market expectations that could destabilise financial markets. In particular, a key risk is that because QE-driven purchases of bonds drove up the price of government debt, and therefore caused a sharp drop in income yields, this then also encouraged investors into a search for yield and into investing in riskier assets such as equities. This resulted in bond markets and equity market prices both rising to historically high valuation levels simultaneously. This, therefore, makes both asset categories vulnerable to a sharp correction. It is important, therefore, that central banks only gradually unwind their holdings of bonds in order to prevent destabilising the financial markets. It is also likely that the timeframe for central banks unwinding their holdings of QE debt purchases will be over several years. They need to balance their timing to neither squash economic recovery by taking too rapid and too strong action, nor, alternatively, let inflation run away by taking action that was too slow and/or too weak. **The potential for central banks to get this timing and strength of action wrong are now key risks.**

There is also a potential key question over whether economic growth has become too dependent on strong central bank stimulus and whether it will maintain its momentum against a backdrop of rising interest rates and the reversal of QE. In the UK, a key vulnerability is the **low level of productivity growth**, which may be the main driver for

increases in wages; and **decreasing consumer disposable income**, which is important in the context of consumer expenditure primarily underpinning UK GDP growth.

A further question that has come to the fore is whether **an inflation target for central banks of 2%**, is now realistic given the shift down in inflation pressures from internally generated inflation, (i.e. wage inflation feeding through into the national economy), given the above mentioned shift down in the Phillips curve.

- Some economists favour a shift to a **lower inflation target of 1%** to emphasise the need to keep the lid on inflation. Alternatively, it is possible that a central bank could simply 'look through' tepid wage inflation, (i.e. ignore the overall 2% inflation target), in order to take action in raising rates sooner than might otherwise be expected.
- However, other economists would argue for a **shift UP in the inflation target to 3%** in order to ensure that central banks place the emphasis on maintaining economic growth through adopting a slower pace of withdrawal of stimulus.
- In addition, there is a strong argument that central banks should **target financial market stability**. As mentioned previously, bond markets and equity markets could be vulnerable to a sharp correction. There has been much commentary, that since 2008, QE has caused massive distortions, imbalances and bubbles in asset prices, both financial and non-financial. Consequently, there are widespread concerns at the potential for such bubbles to be burst by exuberant central bank action. On the other hand, too slow or weak action would allow these imbalances and distortions to continue or to even inflate them further.
- Consumer debt levels are also at historically high levels due to the prolonged period of low cost of borrowing since the financial crash. In turn, this cheap borrowing has meant that **other non-financial asset prices**, particularly house prices, have been driven up to very high levels, especially compared to income levels. Any sharp downturn in the availability of credit, or increase in the cost of credit, could potentially destabilise the housing market and generate a sharp downturn in house prices. This could then have a destabilising effect on consumer confidence, consumer expenditure and GDP growth. However, no central bank would accept that it ought to have responsibility for specifically targeting house prices.

UK. After the UK surprised on the upside with strong economic growth in 2016, **growth in 2017 has been disappointingly weak**; quarter 1 came in at only +0.3% (+1.8% y/y), quarter 2 was +0.3% (+1.5% y/y) and quarter 3 was +0.4% (+1.5% y/y). The main reason for this has been the sharp increase in inflation, caused by the devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum, feeding increases in the cost of imports into the economy. This has caused, in turn, a reduction in consumer disposable income and spending power and so the services sector of the economy, accounting for around 80% of GDP, has seen weak growth as consumers cut back on their expenditure. However, more recently there have been encouraging statistics from the **manufacturing sector** which is seeing strong growth, particularly as a result of increased demand for exports. It has helped that growth in the EU, our main trading partner, has improved significantly over the last year while robust world growth has also been supportive. However, this sector only accounts for around 10% of GDP so expansion in this sector will have a much more muted effect on the overall GDP growth figure for the UK economy as a whole.

While the Bank of England is expected to give forward guidance to prepare financial markets for gradual changes in policy, the **Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), meeting of 14 September 2017** managed to shock financial markets and forecasters by suddenly switching to a much more aggressive tone in terms of its words around warning that Bank Rate will need to rise soon. The Bank of England Inflation Reports during 2017 have clearly flagged up that it expected CPI inflation to peak at just under 3% in 2017, before falling back to near to its target rate of 2% in two years' time. The Bank revised its forecast for the peak to just over 3% at the 14 September meeting. (Inflation actually came in at 3.1% in November so that may prove now to be the peak.) This marginal revision in the Bank's

forecast can hardly justify why the MPC became so aggressive with its wording; rather, the focus was on an emerging view that with unemployment having already fallen to only 4.3%, the lowest level since 1975, and improvements in productivity being so weak, that **the amount of spare capacity in the economy was significantly diminishing** towards a point at which they now needed to take action. In addition, the MPC took a more tolerant view of low wage inflation as this now looks like a common factor in nearly all western economies as a result of automation and globalisation. However, the Bank was also concerned that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU would effectively lead to a *decrease* in such globalisation pressures in the UK, and so this would cause additional inflationary pressure over the next few years.

At its 2 November meeting, the MPC duly delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate. It also gave forward guidance that they expected to increase Bank Rate only twice more in the next three years to reach 1.0% by 2020. This is, therefore, not quite the 'one and done' scenario but is, nevertheless, a very relaxed rate of increase prediction in Bank Rate in line with previous statements that Bank Rate would only go up very gradually and to a limited extent.

However, some forecasters are flagging up that they expect growth to accelerate significantly towards the end of 2017 and then into 2018. This view is based primarily on the coming fall in inflation, (as the effect of the effective devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum drops out of the CPI statistics), which will bring to an end the negative impact on consumer spending power. In addition, a strong export performance will compensate for weak services sector growth. If this scenario was indeed to materialise, then the MPC would be likely to accelerate its pace of increases in Bank Rate during 2018 and onwards.

It is also worth noting the **contradiction within the Bank of England** between action in 2016 and in 2017 **by two of its committees**. After the shock result of the EU referendum, the **Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)** voted in August 2016 for emergency action to cut Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%, restarting £70bn of QE purchases, and also providing UK banks with £100bn of cheap financing. The aim of this was to lower borrowing costs, stimulate demand for borrowing and thereby increase expenditure and demand in the economy. The MPC felt this was necessary in order to ward off their expectation that there would be a sharp slowdown in economic growth. Instead, the economy grew robustly, although the Governor of the Bank of England strongly maintained that this was *because* the MPC took that action. However, other commentators regard this emergency action by the MPC as being proven by events to be a mistake. Then in 2017, we had the **Financial Policy Committee (FPC)** of the Bank of England taking action in June and September over its concerns that cheap borrowing rates, and easy availability of consumer credit, had resulted in too rapid a rate of growth in consumer borrowing and in the size of total borrowing, especially of unsecured borrowing. It, therefore, took punitive action to clamp down on the ability of the main banks to extend such credit! Indeed, a PWC report in October 2017 warned that credit card, car and personal loans and student debt will hit the equivalent of an average of £12,500 per household by 2020. However, averages belie wide variations in levels of debt with much higher exposure being biased towards younger people, especially the 25 -34 year old band, reflecting their lower levels of real income and asset ownership.

One key area of risk is that consumers may have become used to cheap rates since 2008 for borrowing, especially for mortgages. It is a major concern that **some consumers may have over extended their borrowing** and have become complacent about interest rates going up after Bank Rate had been unchanged at 0.50% since March 2009 until falling further to 0.25% in August 2016. This is why forward guidance from the Bank of England continues to emphasise slow and gradual increases in Bank Rate in the coming years. However, consumer borrowing is a particularly vulnerable area in terms of the Monetary Policy Committee getting the pace and strength of Bank Rate increases right - without

causing a sudden shock to consumer demand, confidence and thereby to the pace of economic growth.

Moreover, while there is so much uncertainty around the Brexit negotiations, consumer confidence, and business confidence to spend on investing, it is far too early to be confident about how the next two to three years will actually pan out.

EZ. Economic growth in the eurozone (EZ), (the UK's biggest trading partner), had been lack lustre for several years after the financial crisis despite the ECB eventually cutting its main rate to -0.4% and embarking on a massive programme of QE. However, growth picked up in 2016 and has now gathered substantial strength and momentum thanks to this stimulus. GDP growth was 0.6% in quarter 1 (2.1% y/y), 0.7% in quarter 2 (2.4% y/y) and +0.6% in quarter 3 (2.6% y/y). However, despite providing massive monetary stimulus, the European Central Bank is still struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target and in November inflation was 1.5%. It is therefore unlikely to start on an upswing in rates until possibly 2019. It has, however, announced that it will slow down its monthly QE purchases of debt from €60bn to €30bn from January 2018 and continue to at least September 2018.

USA. Growth in the American economy was notably erratic and volatile in 2015 and 2016. 2017 is following that path again with quarter 1 coming in at only 1.2% but quarter 2 rebounding to 3.1% and quarter 3 coming in at 3.2%. Unemployment in the US has also fallen to the lowest level for many years, reaching 4.1%, while wage inflation pressures, and inflationary pressures in general, have been building. The Fed has started on a gradual upswing in rates with four increases in all and four increases since December 2016; the latest rise was in December 2017 and lifted the central rate to 1.25 – 1.50%. There could then be another four increases in 2018. At its September meeting, the Fed said it would start in October to gradually unwind its \$4.5 trillion balance sheet holdings of bonds and mortgage backed securities by reducing its reinvestment of maturing holdings.

CHINA. Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems.

JAPAN. GDP growth has been gradually improving during 2017 to reach an annual figure of 2.1% in quarter 3. However, it is still struggling to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

Brexit timetable and process

- March 2017: UK government notifies the European Council of its intention to leave under the Treaty on European Union Article 50
- March 2019: initial two-year negotiation period on the terms of exit. In her Florence speech in September 2017, the Prime Minister proposed a two year transitional period after March 2019.
- UK continues as a full EU member until March 2019 with access to the single market and tariff free trade between the EU and UK. Different sectors of the UK economy will leave the single market and tariff free trade at different times during the two year transitional period.
- The UK and EU would attempt to negotiate, among other agreements, a bi-lateral trade agreement over that period.
- The UK would aim for a negotiated agreed withdrawal from the EU, although the UK could also exit without any such agreements in the event of a breakdown of negotiations.

- If the UK exits without an agreed deal with the EU, World Trade Organisation rules and tariffs could apply to trade between the UK and EU - but this is not certain.
- On full exit from the EU: the UK parliament would repeal the 1972 European Communities Act.
- The UK will then no longer participate in matters reserved for EU members, such as changes to the EU's budget, voting allocations and policies.

APPENDIX 3: Treasury Management Practice (TMP1) – Credit and Counterparty Risk Management

SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS: All such investments will be sterling denominated, with maturities up to maximum of 1 year, meeting the minimum ‘high’ quality criteria where applicable.

NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS: These are any investments which do not meet the specified investment criteria. A maximum of 70% will be held in aggregate in non-specified investment

A variety of investment instruments will be used, subject to the credit quality of the institution, and depending on the type of investment made it will fall into one of the above categories.

The criteria, time limits and monetary limits applying to institutions or investment vehicles are:

Specified investments	Minimum credit criteria / colour band	£ limit per institution	Max. maturity period
DMADF – UK Government	N/A	unlimited	6 months
UK Government gilts	UK sovereign rating	unlimited	1 year
UK Government Treasury bills	UK sovereign rating	unlimited	1 year
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	AA	unlimited	1 year
Money market funds	AAA	£15m	Liquid
Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit score of 1.25	AAA	£10m	Liquid
Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit score of 1.5	AAA	£10m	Liquid
Local authorities	N/A	£15m	1 year
CDs or term deposits with banks and building societies	Yellow Purple Blue Orange	£15m £15m £15m £10m	1 year

Non-specified investments	Minimum credit criteria / colour band	£ limit per institution	Max. maturity period
UK Government gilts	UK sovereign rating	unlimited	5 years
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	UK sovereign rating	unlimited	5 years
Local authorities	N/A	£15m	5 years
Housing Associations	AA-	£2m	1 year
CDs or Term deposits with banks and building societies	Yellow Purple Blue Orange Red Green No Colour	unlimited £15m £15m £10m £10m £10m	Up to 5 years Up to 2 years Up to 1 year Up to 1 year Up to 6 Months Up to 100 days Not for use
Corporate bonds	AA- A-	£5m £2m	1 year
Repurchase agreements	AA	£5m	5 years

APPENDIX 4: Approved countries for investments

This list is based on those countries which have sovereign ratings of AA- or higher and also have banks operating in sterling markets which have credit ratings of green or above in the Link Asset Services credit worthiness service.

AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

AA+

- Finland
- Hong Kong
- U.S.A.

AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France
- U.K.

AA-

- Belgium
- Qatar

APPENDIX 5: Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation

(i) Full Council

- receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities;
- approval of annual strategy.

(ii) Cabinet

- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices;
- budget consideration and approval;
- approval of the division of responsibilities;
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations;
- approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.

(iii) Overview and Scrutiny Commission

- reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.

APPENDIX 6: The Treasury Management Role of the Section 151 Officer

The S151 (responsible) officer

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.
- preparation of a capital strategy to include capital expenditure, capital financing, non-financial investments and treasury management, with a long term timeframe.
- ensuring that the capital strategy is prudent, sustainable, affordable and prudent in the long term and provides value for money
- ensuring that due diligence has been carried out on all treasury and non-financial investments and is in accordance with the risk appetite of the authority
- ensure that the authority has appropriate legal powers to undertake expenditure on non-financial assets and their financing
- ensuring the proportionality of all investments so that the authority does not undertake a level of investing which exposes the authority to an excessive level of risk compared to its financial resources
- ensuring that an adequate governance process is in place for the approval, monitoring and ongoing risk management of all non-financial investments and long term liabilities
- provision to members of a schedule of all non-treasury investments including material investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures, loans and financial guarantees.
- ensuring that members are adequately informed and understand the risk exposures taken on by an authority
- ensuring that the authority has adequate expertise, either in house or externally provided, to carry out the above
- creation of Treasury Management Practices which specifically deal with how non treasury investments will be carried out and managed, to include the following :-
 - *Risk management (TMP1 and schedules), including investment and risk management criteria for any material non-treasury investment portfolios;*
 - *Performance measurement and management (TMP2 and schedules), including methodology and criteria for assessing the performance and success of non-treasury investments;*

- *Decision making, governance and organisation (TMP5 and schedules), including a statement of the governance requirements for decision making in relation to non-treasury investments; and arrangements to ensure that appropriate professional due diligence is carried out to support decision making;*
- *Reporting and management information (TMP6 and schedules), including where and how often monitoring reports are taken;*
- *Training and qualifications (TMP10 and schedules), including how the relevant knowledge and skills in relation to non-treasury investments will be arranged.*